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The Land of Oz: Spoliation of Evidence in Louisiana 
INTRODUCTION 
Take a trip down the yellow brick road. The Wizard decided to 
sell a new energy drink, Courage. The Cowardly Lion, in need of 
courage, bought and consumed the beverage. Shortly thereafter he 
became ill and incurred medical expenses from a week’s stay in the 
hospital. The Lion’s attorney quickly notified the Wizard of the 
Lion’s intention to file suit against the Wizard, alleging that the Lion 
consumed Courage from a bad batch. Upon hearing of the potential 
litigation, the Wizard destroyed all of the samples from that 
particular batch. Without any “bad” Courage to test, the Lion was 
unable to prove the drink made him sick and could not recover 
damages. 
The Wizard’s actions are commonly known as “spoliation of 
evidence.” Spoliation of evidence occurs when a party destroys, 
conceals, or alters evidence in order to disadvantage another party.1 
The Wizard’s malicious intent qualifies his actions as intentional 
spoliation of evidence. In this situation, the Lion has a claim for 
intentional spoliation of evidence, which is most likely recognized 
by the courts of Oz.2 
If the above scenario is altered slightly, the result varies greatly. 
Now, imagine that the Lion could not recover the allegedly “bad” 
batch of Courage, yet he could not prove that the Wizard 
intentionally destroyed it. Further, Oz Code article 1939 demands 
that manufacturers of beverages retain one finished product from 
each batch for at least four years after its creation. This situation 
should be actionable under a version of negligent spoliation that 
roots the duty to preserve the evidence in the statute. In many 
jurisdictions, however, despite the law creating a duty mandating 
that the Wizard keep such evidence, the Lion would be without a 
remedy.3 
Finally, consider a slightly different scenario: On hearing of the 
Lion’s sickness, the Wizard separated the bad batch from the rest 
and stored it in a closet. Then, at the time of trial, the Wizard learned 
that one of his employees mistakenly threw away the bad batch. In 
this situation, though it seems that the Lion should be entitled to 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by DANIELLE “DANI” BOREL. 
 1. Rachel A. Campbell, Effect of Spoliation of Evidence in Tort Actions 
Other than Product Liability Actions, 121 A.L.R. 5th 157, 157 (2004); Randolph 
v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1027 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1994). 
 2. See infra Part I.B. 
 3. See infra Part I.B. 
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some recovery, this form of negligent spoliation of evidence is also 
not recognized by many jurisdictions.4 
The Lion’s predicament is the same as the dilemma facing 
Louisiana’s doctrine of spoliation. As noted in Lewis v. Albertson’s 
Inc., “[t]he Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to address the potential 
tort right of spoliation stemming from negligence principles, 
including its requirements and the remedy for this cause of action; 
the issue is certainly ripe for consideration.”5 In Louisiana, negligent 
spoliation is controversial and disputed.6 For instance, in Arnold v. 
Brookshire Grocery Co., the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals enumerated the elements of spoliation as follows: “(1) the 
intentional or negligent destruction of evidence and (2) that the first 
element was for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of its use.”7 In 
theory, the Arnold court found that a party may negligently deprive 
a party of evidence for a purpose. In reality, however, to do 
something negligently with a purpose is impossible.8 This logical 
fallacy illustrates the lack of clarity in Louisiana law and, in 
particular, the difficulties of determining the elements of negligent 
or intentional spoliation of evidence. As neither the Louisiana 
Supreme Court nor the Louisiana Legislature has addressed this 
issue, the Louisiana courts, lawyers, and potential litigants direly 
need a coherent doctrine for consistent guidance, adequate 
preparation, and protection against injury, respectively. 
This Comment proposes a treatment of spoliation that would 
offer clarity to courts on the issue. Specifically, this Comment 
contains two arguments. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court ought 
to accept the current theory of intentional spoliation found in the 
Louisiana appellate courts.9 Second, this Comment argues for the 
                                                                                                             
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771, 774–75 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
2006). 
 6. See infra Part II.C. 
 7. Arnold v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 10 So. 3d 1279, 1280 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2009). 
 8. State v. Vinzant, 7 So. 2d 917, 922 (La. 1942). 
 9. Union Pump Co. v. Centrifugal Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 05-0287, 
2009 WL 3015076, at *5 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2009) (“All five Louisiana Circuit 
Courts of Appeal have recognized [intentional] spoliation as a valid tort claim. 
Accordingly, it is this Court’s Erie guess that the Louisiana Supreme Court would 
find spoliation of the evidence to be a valid tort claim.” (citations omitted)); 
Bertrand v. Fischer, No. 09-0076, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2–3 (W.D. La. Dec. 14, 
2011) (“The Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, therefore federal 
courts must make an Erie guess to determine as best as it can what that court 
would decide. . . . [T]he Louisiana Supreme Court would only recognize 
spoliation based on intentional conduct.” (quoting Union Pump, 2009 WL 
3015076, at *5)). 
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Louisiana Supreme Court and Louisiana Legislature to recognize 
negligent spoliation. Negligent spoliation is the more controversial 
form of spoliation and the focus of this Comment. The Comment 
begins by looking at the origin of the tort of spoliation before 
analyzing the tort under Louisiana’s legal precepts. Part I examines 
the doctrines of other states, starting with the origin of spoliation 
generally in California and then discussing some states that have 
recognized negligent spoliation. Part II discusses Louisiana’s 
various approaches to spoliation. The Louisiana circuit courts vary 
on the elements of: (1) the knowledge of a potential suit, (2) the 
failure to produce needed evidence without explanation, and (3) the 
level of culpability required.10 Because the most controversial issue 
is whether negligent spoliation is actionable, this Comment also 
examines in depth the evolution of three lines of reasoning regarding 
spoliation. Part III argues that Louisiana should recognize a cause of 
action for negligent spoliation. Such recognition would conform to 
existing Louisiana law and jurisprudence and is necessary to uphold 
the principles of judicial integrity, fairness, and truth.11 
I. THE APPEARANCE OF THE RUBY SLIPPERS: BACKGROUND 
A. Munchkinland: Spoliation’s Infancy 
Analyzing the inception of spoliation and the reasons for its 
creation validates the need to recognize negligent spoliation in 
Louisiana. The first court to recognize the tort of spoliation, 
specifically intentional spoliation, was a California appellate court in 
Smith v. Superior Court.12 In Smith, the defendant’s wheel flew off 
of his van and into the windshield of the plaintiff’s vehicle, causing 
injury to the plaintiff.13 Abbot Ford, the automobile dealer that 
customized the van before the defendant bought it, promised the 
plaintiff’s counsel that he would keep the relevant van parts that 
would be needed as physical evidence.14 Subsequently, the 
dealership “destroyed, lost or transferred” the requested parts, 
effectively eliminating the chance of success for any possible defect 
claim.15 The plaintiffs then amended their petition to include a claim 
for “Tortious Interference with Prospective Civil Actions By 
                                                                                                             
 10. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 11. See infra Part III.C. 
 12. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); 18 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 
515 (2013). 
 13. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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Spoliation of Evidence.”16 The court held that it was appropriate to 
recognize a new tort to deal with intentional spoliation of 
evidence.17 The court supported its decision with Dean Prosser’s 
concept of protection against “interference with the interest of 
others.”18 The court expressed some reservation in recognizing the 
new tort action due to the difficulty of determining damages.19 In 
dispelling this concern, the court discussed other actions that are 
recognized despite uncertain damages, such as libel, slander, 
wrongful death, and personal injury cases.20 Smith opened the door 
for other courts to recognize intentional spoliation of evidence. 
Soon after Smith, California also recognized negligent 
spoliation.21 In Velasco v. Commercial Building, a cleaning staff 
member threw away critical evidence that was sitting on an 
attorney’s desk.22 The attorney then brought suit against the cleaning 
staff company for the destruction of the evidence. The attorney’s 
claim was essentially a negligent spoliation claim, which had not yet 
been recognized by California courts.23 In recognizing that a claim 
for negligent spoliation should exist, the Velasco court focused its 
analysis on the foreseeability of the harm that the destruction of 
evidence would cause the plaintiff.24 The court noted that 
foreseeability of the harm is gauged by more than just the 
probability of a behavior resulting in the harm.25 Rather, 
foreseeability that a person’s actions could cause harm includes 
actions that a reasonable, thoughtful person would consider as 
                                                                                                             
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 832. 
 18. William Prosser served as the dean of UC Berkeley School of Law. He is 
best known for his work entitled Privacy, which described an individual’s right to 
privacy. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Firsts at Berkeley Law, SFGATE, Feb. 26, 
2012, http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Privacy-firsts-at-Berkeley-Law-336 
1110.php; Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (“The law of torts is anything but static, 
and the limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the 
plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the 
defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to 
a remedy. . . . The common threat woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable 
interference with the interests of others.” (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF 
TORTS § 1, at 3–4, 6 (4th ed. 1971))). 
 19. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835. 
 20. Id. at 836. 
 21. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1985) (“[W]e hold that a cause of action may be stated for negligent 
destruction of evidence needed for prospective civil litigation.”). 
 22. Id. at 505. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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guidance for practical behavior.26 If a person creates a slight risk of 
injury to another, he may be held liable if a reasonably prudent 
person would not have done so.27 Applying this reasoning to the 
facts, the Velasco court considered whether the person who 
destroyed the evidence would “be expected to believe that he or she 
would destroy valuable evidence which might decrease a client’s 
chance of recovery in a product liability action” under the 
circumstances.28 
Further, the Velasco court supported its recognition of negligent 
spoliation claims by looking to two previously recognized torts: 
“negligent interference with prospective economic advantage” and 
“intentional interference with prospective business advantage.”29 In 
both tort actions, the absence of the necessary component resulted in 
the loss of a future economic benefit to the plaintiff. Implicitly, the 
court was analogizing the harms created by negligent spoliation with 
an economic loss and stated “that both causes of action would 
reimburse victims for probable expectancies, which make up ‘a 
large part of what is most valuable in modern life.’”30 When 
negligent spoliation occurs, the wrongful destruction of evidence 
can result in the harmed party either losing a judgment that it would 
have been entitled to recover or paying a judgment for which it was 
not liable. In Velasco, the economic harm was the judgment amount 
that the plaintiff would have received in his products liability claim 
had the evidence not been destroyed. Nevertheless, despite the 
Velasco court’s recognition of negligent spoliation as a valid tort 
claim, it found that the plaintiff in that case was unable to recover 
under that theory.31 
Smith and Velasco paved the way for more widespread 
development of the tort of spoliation. Beginning in products liability 
cases, the doctrine then infiltrated other areas of the law and other 
states.32 As with any new tort, some states were quick to follow suit, 
while others rejected the foreign concept.33 In particular, only a few 
states subsequently recognized negligent spoliation. 
                                                                                                             
 26. Id. at 506. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 505–06. 
 30. Sean R. Levine, Spoliation of Evidence in West Virginia: Do Too Many 
Torts Spoliate the Broth?, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 419, 425 (2002). 
 31. Velasco, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506–07. 
 32. See Levine, supra note 30, at 425–26. 
 33. Id. at 426. 
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B. Follow the Yellow Brick Road: Later States to Recognize 
Negligent Spoliation 
After the decisions in California, other states began to evaluate 
their own positions on intentional and negligent spoliation.34 Some 
states settled the doctrine judicially,35 while others passed statutes.36 
Nonetheless, most states have not formally recognized either form 
of spoliation as a tort action.37 Specifically, the only jurisdictions to 
recognize negligent spoliation as of 2006 were Alabama, California, 
Indiana, Montana, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.38 
Illinois and Pennsylvania found recognition of a separate tort 
unnecessary because the effects of negligent spoliation could be 
remedied under existing “general negligence principles.”39 Before 
advocating for the recognition of negligent spoliation, it is important 
to review the laws of other states that find negligent spoliation 
actionable in order to determine if their reasons are applicable in 
Louisiana. 
Some states found it necessary to recognize negligent spoliation 
in order to allow an action to be brought against a third party who is 
not involved in the original litigation.40 West Virginia is one of these 
states. It recognizes negligent spoliation against third parties but not 
against parties to original civil action.41 The West Virginia Supreme 
Court found that sufficient remedies already existed for a party to a 
civil action to compensate the opposing party for evidence that was 
lost or destroyed.42 These available solutions did not, however, 
address spoliation by a third party.43 In recognizing a theory of 
negligent spoliation by a third party, the court discussed some 
concerns: namely, that a duty did not exist to preserve evidence and 
that, if the third parties were the owners of such evidence, the 
owners would normally have the right to handle their property as 
                                                                                                             
 34. MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS 
AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 53, 56 
(Daniel F. Gourash ed., 2000). 
 35. MASS. GUIDE TO EVID. § 1102, at 284 (2013), available at http://www 
.mass.gov/courts/sjc/guide-to-evidence/massguidetoevidence.pdf. 
 36. Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000). 
 37. KOESEL, supra note 34, at 55. 
 38. Id. at 50; Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 573 (W. Va. 2003). 
 39. KOESEL, supra note 34, at 51. 
 40. See Smith, 771 So. 2d at 432–33; Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 
11, 18 (Mont. 1999); Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 566. 
 41. Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 566 (establishing that the state courts do “not 
recognize spoliation of evidence as a stand-alone tort when the spoliation is the 
result of the negligence of a party to a civil action”). 
 42. Id. at 567. 
 43. Id. at 568. 
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they see fit.44 Nevertheless, the equity behind the tort of spoliation 
outweighed these concerns.45 In recognizing spoliation, the court 
cited the state constitution, which guarantees the right to use the 
court system to seek justice and the general principle of searching 
for the truth that underlies the judicial system.46 “Simply put, such 
highly improper and unjustifiable conduct ought to be actionable.”47 
Thus, for the reasons of equity and justice, West Virginia recognized 
a form of negligent spoliation. 
Similar to the West Virginia Supreme Court, the Supreme Court 
of Montana based its recognition of negligent spoliation against a 
third party on notions of truth and fairness.48 Building on the idea 
that damages could be awarded against a party who destroyed 
evidence and impaired the investigation of an officer, the court 
found that “[r]elevant evidence is critical to the search for truth.”49 
The Supreme Court of Montana specified that it was essential for 
the lower courts to take measures that would ensure “that the parties 
to the litigation have a fair opportunity to present their claims or 
defenses.”50 In order to protect the opportunities each party should 
be afforded, the court recognized negligent spoliation claims against 
third parties.51 
Finally, select states have imposed the necessity of a narrow 
duty in order to limit the application of negligent spoliation.52 This 
reasoning was present in Alabama’s recognition of negligent 
spoliation.53 Finding that the concept of negligent spoliation was 
consistent with Alabama’s general negligence principles, the 
Alabama Supreme Court held that a plaintiff would similarly have to 
show a breached duty, proximate cause, and damages.54 Alabama 
courts require a plaintiff to show “(1) that the defendant spoliator 
had actual knowledge of pending or potential litigation; (2) that a 
duty was imposed upon the defendant through a voluntary 
undertaking, an agreement, or a specific request; and (3) that the 
missing evidence was vital to the plaintiff's pending or potential 
action.”55 Thus, the court reasoned that the third party could decline 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 572. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17 (Mont. 1999). 
 49. Id. at 17. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 17–18. 
 52. Id. at 20; Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 569 (W. Va. 2003); Smith v. 
Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000). 
 53. Smith, 771 So. 2d at 432. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 432. 
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to take responsibility for the evidence, which would keep the burden 
of risk with the plaintiff, but if the third party agreed to take 
responsibility for the evidence, it formed a duty.56 This type of 
negligent spoliation that requires such a specific duty curtails 
negligent spoliation to only claims where the “spoliator has acted 
wrongfully in a specifically identified way.”57 Establishment of 
these elements creates a rebuttable presumption that “but for the fact 
of the spoliation of evidence the plaintiff would have recovered in 
the pending or potential litigation.”58 Alabama’s model is a limited 
form of negligent spoliation that hinges on an agreement between 
the parties.59 
These states’ approaches to negligent spoliation demonstrate 
that, unfortunately, there is no consensus on how to handle negligent 
spoliation claims.60 The confusion created by the lack of guidance is 
exemplified in Louisiana, which has specifically grappled with 
defining and accepting the concept of negligent spoliation. 
II. THE SEARCH FOR THE EMERALD CITY: LOUISIANA’S ADVENTURES 
Spoliation of evidence is a relatively new tort concept to 
Louisiana, which grew out of the State’s use of adverse 
presumptions.61 Adverse presumptions or discovery sanctions are 
used to counter the negative effects of ruined evidence “by 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. at 433. 
 57. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 
241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)). 
 58. Id. at 432–33.  
 59. Id. at 433. 
 60. Arkansas implements an adverse presumption when the defending party 
has destroyed evidence but refuses to recognize spoliation as a separate tort. See 
Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., Inc., 27 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Ark. 2000). Texas 
has not recognized spoliation as a separate tort, finding that spoliation does not 
harm a party outside of the cause of action from which it arose. See Brookshire 
Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, No. 12-08-00368-CV, 2010 WL 2982902, at *5 (Tex. 
App. July 30, 2010). Connecticut recognizes intentional spoliation and awards 
“the full amount of compensatory damages that he or she would have received if 
the underlying action had been pursued successfully.” Rizzuto v. Davidson 
Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1181 (Conn. 2006). 
 61. Karen Wells Roby & Pamela W. Carter, Spoliation: The Case of the 
Missing Evidence, 47 LA. B.J. 222, 224 (1999) (“The impact of the presumption 
on the quality of evidence significantly diminished with the reasonable 
explanation rule and the occasional notice and showing of intent requirements. 
Litigants in Louisiana who needed to advance or defend a case began seeking a 
remedy against a party who spoliated evidence. In Williams v. General Motors . . . 
third party plaintiff, General Motors, sought the recognition of a tort against an 
attorney and insurer for destroying evidence it needed to defend against the 
plaintiff’s product liability claim.”). 
2014] COMMENT 515 
 
 
 
instructing the jury . . . that had the evidence in question been 
presented, it would be unfavorable to the party spoliator.”62 In other 
words, when a plaintiff’s case is injured because the plaintiff is 
unable to prove a part of the case due to the defendant’s failure to 
turn over evidence, the jury is instructed to assume that the evidence 
would have benefitted the plaintiff.63 This mechanism attempts to 
level the playing field. Adverse presumptions are both 
compensatory and punitive in nature.64 
Traditionally, only intentional acts of spoliation were actionable 
and thus eligible for an adverse presumption.65 At common law, 
spoliation was based on the idea that a party is more likely to 
destroy evidence that is adverse or harmful to his or her case than to 
refuse to turn over evidence that would bolster the case.66 The 
adverse presumption has been characterized in other jurisdictions as 
“omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem: all things are presumed 
against a wrongdoer.”67 Mere negligence was insufficient to support 
“the inference of consciousness of a weak case.”68 
Adverse presumptions, however, were applied inconsistently, 
which, as the Louisiana Bar Journal noted in 1999, resulted “in 
                                                                                                             
 62. Guillory v. Dillard’s Dept. Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d 1, 3 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2000); Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. La. 1992); 
Pham v. Contico Int’l, Inc., 759 So. 2d 880, 882 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000); Roby & 
Carter, supra note 61, at 223 (“The adverse presumption was first applied in 
Louisiana in the 1910 case of Varnado v. Banner Cotton. In Varnado, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court applied the adverse presumption against corporate 
managers who refused to produce records of the corporation during a proceeding 
seeking the appointment of a receiver. The court held that the managers’ refusal to 
produce the records suggested that the records would show that the corporation 
was being mismanaged thereby warranting the appointment of a receiver. During 
the Varnado era, the presumption had a strong impact on the quality of evidence 
presented. If a person had evidence and refused to produce it, the presumption 
would apply against him. The integrity of the judicial system was protected. More 
than 60 years after Varnado, parties began seeking the application of the 
presumption to matters where the evidence was lost, discarded or destroyed. Once 
the courts extended the adverse presumption to cases involving spoliated evidence, 
a conflict developed in the circuits regarding when it would apply.”). 
 63. Robertson v. Frank’s Super Value Foods, Inc., 7 So. 3d 669, 673 (La. Ct. 
App. 5th 2009); FRANK L. MARAIST, EVIDENCE AND PROOF § 4.3, in 19 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 72 (2007) (“If a party knowingly destroys 
evidence (spoliates), there is a logical inference that he or she did so because the 
evidence would have been unfavorable to him or her.”). 
 64. Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357, 
1365 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1994) (Waltzer, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. at 1361. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, No. 12-08-00368-CV, 2010 WL 
2982902, at *4 (Tex. App. July 30, 2010). 
 68. Kammerer, 633 So. 2d at 1361 (Waltzer, J., concurring). 
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additional requests for the recognition of the tort of spoliation.”69 
Further, adverse presumptions were ineffective against persons who 
were not parties to the litigation.70 Such was the case in Desselle v. 
Jefferson Hospital District No. 2, when a plaintiff desired to bring 
suit against the manufacturer of a hospital gurney.71 The plaintiff fell 
off of the gurney and was injured, either because the hospital 
employee “failed to set the brake or the brake failed.”72 The plaintiff 
claimed his case against the manufacturer was hindered by the 
hospital’s disposal of the gurney.73 The Desselle court allowed the 
plaintiff to bring a claim of spoliation against the hospital, though 
ultimately the plaintiff was unsuccessful.74 To remedy similar 
situations, courts have allowed a claim of spoliation to be brought 
against third parties.75 However, this tort is no longer exclusive to 
non-litigant parties.76 Claims in Louisiana have been allowed 
against both the tortfeasor–defendant and third parties.77 
The scope of the cause of action for spoliation is unsettled in 
Louisiana.78 Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to 
discuss either form of spoliation, all five state appellate circuit 
courts have recognized intentional spoliation as a valid tort claim 
and continue to battle over negligent spoliation.79 Because the State 
as a whole lacks guidance from the Louisiana Supreme Court and 
the Louisiana Legislature, the circuits have attempted to sort out the 
doctrine by themselves. In doing so, they have established varying 
holdings within their circuits, overruled and reinstated cases at a 
rapid pace, and clearly ignored previous holdings. In particular, 
                                                                                                             
 69. Roby & Carter, supra note 61, at 226 (“Consequently, with the continuing 
push by parties for an adequate remedy for the spoliation problem, the form and 
shape of the spoliation tort will inevitably occur. The recognition of this tort is 
necessary to preserve the integrity of the system.”). 
 70. Desselle v. Jefferson Hosp. District No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 527, 534–35 
(La. Ct. App. 5th 2004). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 527. 
 73. Id. at 534. 
 74. Id. at 535. 
 75. See Randolph v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1st 
1994); Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006). 
 76. See Jackson v. Home Depot, Inc., 906 So. 2d 721 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2005); 
McCleary v. Terrebone Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010 WL 
3822225 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010); Guillory v. Dillard’s Dept. Store, Inc., 
777 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2000); McCool v. Beauregard Mem’l Hosp., 814 
So. 2d 116 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2002). 
 77. See supra notes 75–76. 
 78. See Bertrand v. Fischer, No. 09-0076, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2 (W.D. La. 
Dec. 14, 2011). 
 79. Union Pump Co. v. Centrifugal Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 05-0287, 
2009 WL 3015076, at *5 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2009). 
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Louisiana appellate courts have had disagreements regarding the 
concept of an adequate explanation, the required level of culpability, 
and the source of the duty.80 Therefore, when handling a spoliation 
claim, the courts have little guidance. The results have left Louisiana 
with an unclear and disjointed delict.81 
Courts have never followed an established set of elements for 
spoliation. Yet, the jurisprudence shows courts typically consider 
three “elements.” These elements are not always clearly articulated 
within the cases, and the courts often blur the lines between them. 
This Part will outline Louisiana jurisprudence according to these 
unstated elements of spoliation. These elements are: (1) the 
knowledge of a lawsuit; (2) failure to produce needed evidence 
without an explanation; and (3) the requisite level of intent. 
A. Knowledge of a Lawsuit 
The first requirement found in the jurisprudence to hold a 
defendant liable for spoliation is that the defendant knew or should 
have known of a future or likely lawsuit.82 This criterion narrows the 
instances in which a party has the heightened duty to protect or 
retain possible evidence to situations in which it is most likely that 
the evidence will actually be used or requested. The courts have 
implicitly accepted this element.83 
The first element, the knowledge requirement, grew out of the 
“adequate explanation” exception to an adverse presumption.84 In 
Babineaux v. Black, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered whether the third-party defendant should be granted an 
adverse presumption against the defendant.85 The third-party 
defendant, the manufacturer of the allegedly faulty product in 
question, claimed that the primary defendant, the seller of the 
product, spoliated evidence by not producing the product in question 
for “inspection prior to trial.”86 The court found that an adverse 
presumption was not warranted because the testimony explained the 
defendant’s actions.87 “When the [product] was discarded, this suit 
had not been filed, and the defendants obviously thought that 
installing the new [product] would solve the problem to the 
                                                                                                             
 80. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 81. See Bertrand, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2. 
 82. Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc., 869 So. 2d 922, 927 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Babineaux v. Black, 396 So. 2d 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1981). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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plaintiff’s satisfaction.”88 The court intertwined the idea of 
knowledge of a lawsuit into the reasonable explanation exception.89 
Now, knowledge of the suit stands as a separate element for proving 
spoliation.90 Thus, courts clearly stipulate that “[w]here suit has not 
been filed and there is no evidence that a party knew suit would be 
filed when the evidence was discarded, the theory of spoliation of 
evidence does not apply.”91  
B. Failure to Produce Needed Evidence 
In order to have a claim for spoliation, there must be the loss or 
destruction of evidence that impairs the case of the claimant, which 
the other party cannot adequately explain.92 Despite being addressed 
as a single concept, in actuality, these ideas are an element with two 
subparts and an affirmative defense, respectively. Therefore, these 
components should be evaluated independently. 
1. Evidence Must Have Previously Existed 
The courts have found that if the evidence never existed, then 
that is sufficient to defeat a claim for spoliation.93 Although a 
claimant can allege spoliation for the destruction or loss of evidence, 
he or she cannot bring a spoliation claim for the failure to create 
evidence that would have been helpful.94 Allowing spoliation in 
those circumstances would impose a duty that is far broader than the 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. 
 89. For discussion of the “reasonable explanation exception,” see infra Part 
II.B.3. 
 90. Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc., 869 So. 2d 922, 927 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004). 
 91. Id. See also Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 
524, 534 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2004); McCleary v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov’t, 
No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010 WL 3822225, at *3 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010). 
 92. Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(“Here, the destruction of the Smiths’ physical evidence took place before the trial 
ever began, and the Smiths seek compensation for the alleged intentional 
destruction of important evidence to be used in the forthcoming litigation.”); 
Guillory v. Dillard’s Dept. Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d 1, 4 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2000) 
(“[B]oth causes of action are premised on the right of a plaintiff to be free from 
interference in pursuing and/or proving his or her lawsuit.”); Arnold v. Brookshire 
Grocery Co., 10 So. 3d 1279, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2009) (“Ms. Romero’s 
[destruction of the evidence] did not impair the plaintiff’s cause of action.”); 
Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771, 774 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2006); Hebert 
v. Richard, 72 So. 3d 892, 905 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011). 
 93. See Clavier v. Our Lady of Lake Hosp., Inc., 112 So. 3d 881, 886 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 2012); Jackson v. Home Depot, Inc., 906 So. 2d 721, 728 (La. Ct. App. 
1st 2005). 
 94. Jackson, 906 So. 2d at 728. 
2014] COMMENT 519 
 
 
 
policy intended behind the delict. In short, a complaint alleging 
spoliation of evidence that never existed is facially invalid.95 
In Jackson v. Home Depot, Mr. Jackson’s spoliation claim was 
based on the theory that Home Depot failed to preserve evidence 
because it did not fill out an accident report following the tort 
incident in question.96 The court found that this allegation failed to 
meet the burden of a well-pleaded complaint.97 “Mr. Jackson does 
not clearly refer to any particular piece of evidence that he alleges 
actually existed and which Home Depot intentionally destroyed in 
order to deprive him of its use.”98 Vague references, suppositions, 
and legal conclusions cannot take the place of succinct and definite 
facts upon which a cause of action must depend.99 This finding 
rested on the fact that Home Depot could not destroy something that 
never existed.100 
One case asserts that even if impairment is present, the mere 
lack of the evidence is not actionable if the evidence has not been 
destroyed or concealed but merely cannot be identified.101 The court 
in Pham v. Contico International, Inc. held that the accused party 
must have destroyed or concealed the evidence for it to be 
actionable as spoliation.102 In Pham, the claimant’s assertion that his 
employer “failed to identify, set aside, or further preserve the 
particular collapsible crate needed as evidence” was insufficient to 
establish a cause of action.103 The crate in question was still in use at 
the warehouse because it was a needed piece of operation 
equipment.104 The plaintiffs were welcome to visit the warehouse 
and inspect the crate, but at the time of litigation, no one knew 
which crate was the one involved in the incident.105 Thus, Pham 
formed the idea that unless the absence of the evidence is caused by 
concealment or destruction, it is not spoliation. In this case, the 
failure to identify the crate in question was not seen as being 
equivalent to destroying the evidence. Because spoliation is based 
on the destruction, alteration, or failure to produce evidence, it 
                                                                                                             
 95. Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. v. Nunley, 77 So. 3d 457, 465 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
2011) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Mr. May’s 
explanation that the hard data sought by the Nunleys never existed.”). 
 96. Jackson, 906 So. 2d at 725. 
 97. Id. at 728. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Pham v. Continco Int’l., Inc., 759 So. 2d 880, 883–84 (La. Ct. App. 5th 
2000). 
 102. Id. at 884. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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seems contrary to its purpose to allow claims against evidence that 
was not destroyed, altered, or hidden. 
2. The Failure to Produce Evidence Must Impair the Claimant’s 
Case 
The second element, the heart of spoliation and the reason 
claims arise, is the failure to produce evidence.106 Yet, there is often 
an unmentioned sub-element related to this requirement: The failure 
to produce the evidence must impair the claimant’s case.107 Without 
impairment of the claimant’s case, spoliation is not actionable.108 
In Arnold v. Brookshire Grocery Co., the Louisiana Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s failure to 
produce evidence did not impair the plaintiff’s claim.109 In this case, 
Mrs. Arnold slipped and fell on broken eggs in the aisle of a grocery 
store.110 Mrs. Arnold alleged spoliation because the employees 
cleaned up the eggs before the manager could photograph them.111 
The defendants did not contest the presence of the eggs.112 Because 
there were three people who admittedly saw the floor and eggs, the 
court found that a photograph was unnecessary, though it would 
have been helpful.113 Ultimately, the suit was dismissed.114 Further, 
in Crittion v. State, the Second Circuit established that a spoliation 
claim is meritless if the party had a significant amount of time to 
utilize the evidence in question before it was destroyed.115 
                                                                                                             
 106. Desselle v. Jefferson Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 534 (La. Ct. App. 
5th 2004) (“The theory of ‘spoliation of evidence’ refers to an intentional 
destruction of evidence for purpose of depriving opposing parties of its use.”); 
Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357, 1362 (La. 
Ct. App. 4th 1994) (Waltzer, J., concurring) (“Essential to the fabric of the 
construction is the citizen’s right of access to the evidence necessary to prove his 
case . . . .”). See Roby & Carter, supra note 61. 
 107. Daotheuang v. El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co., 940 So. 2d 752, 756–57 (La. 
Ct. App. 2d 2006) (The adverse presumption operates under the notion that the 
lack of evidence “has impaired the party’s ability to institute or prove a civil claim 
due to negligent or intentional spoliation of evidence.” (quoting McCool v. 
Beauregard Mem’l Hosp., 814 So. 2d 116, 118 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2002))). 
 108. Arnold v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 10 So. 3d 1279, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2009). 
 109. Id. at 1280. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1281. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (“[C]lean-up of the mess did not impair the plaintiff’s cause of action   
. . . .”). 
 115. See Critton v. State, 986 So. 2d 207, 209−10 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2008). The 
plaintiff in Critton asserted a claim for spoliation because the DOTD paved over 
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According to the Critton court, even if it can be shown that the 
defendant destroyed the evidence in question, if the plaintiff had 
ample time to utilize the evidence for its own purposes and failed to 
do so, the claim will fail.116 
3. An “Adequate” Explanation for the Failure to Produce 
Evidence Will Defeat a Spoliation Claim 
Next, the courts generally evaluate whether the defendant’s 
affirmative defense can “adequately” explain the absence of the 
evidence.117 What has been allowed to pass as an “adequate 
explanation” varies greatly.118 In Wilhite v. Thompson, Geraldine 
Wilhite’s family brought a medical malpractice case against Dr. 
LeFleur and Dr. Thompson.119 Throughout the course of discovery, 
neither doctor could provide Mr. Wilhite’s medical chart.120 Dr. 
Thompson explained the nonproduction of the chart by claiming that 
he was unable to find it after he handed it over to his office 
manager.121 The court found this explanation adequate and, thus, did 
not find an adverse presumption necessary.122 Further, the court 
supported this conclusion by noting that the “testimony depicts the 
good faith efforts made by [d]efendants to make the chart available 
                                                                                                             
 
the section of the roadway where the plaintiff’s daughter was involved in an 
accident. Id. The DOTD resurfaced the roadway two years after the lawsuit was 
filed. Id. In the three years after the accident, plaintiff failed to have any test 
conducted on the condition of the road. Id. The court declined to award the 
plaintiff an adverse presumption. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See McCleary v. Terrebone Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208, 
2010 WL 3822225, at *6 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010); Gladney v. Milam, 
911 So. 2d 366, 369 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2005); Hebert v. Richard, 72 So. 3d 892, 905 
(La. Ct. App. 3d 2011); Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc., 869 So. 2d 922, 927 (La. Ct. 
App. 4th 2004); Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 
534 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2004). 
 118. Compare McCleary, 2010 WL 3822225, at *6, with Babineaux v. Blake, 
396 So. 2d at 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 3rd 1981), Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 
493, 498−99 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007), and Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 
771, 774 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006). 
 119. Wilhite, 962 So. 2d at 497. 
 120. Id. at 497. 
 121. Id. at 498 (“Dr. Thompson testified that he last saw the chart when he 
handed it to his office manager after receiving notice of the malpractice claim. He 
instructed her to secure the chart. Both Defendants testified that, in 2001, their 
clinic had thousands of records. Dr. Thompson also testified that he instructed his 
staff to search the office for the missing chart without success.”). 
 122. Id. at 499. 
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to [p]laintiffs during this litigation.”123 Not only did the court inject 
a “good faith” standard, which had not previously existed, but it also 
ignored the statute that expressly requires a physician to preserve 
medical records for six years after the patient’s last visit.124 Thus, 
Wilhite provides some indication that courts may be willing to find 
an excuse “adequate” when the behavior contributing to the loss of 
evidence is otherwise negligent. 
In Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., the court also found that the 
defendant’s testimony adequately explained the absence of needed 
evidence.125 In Lewis, the plaintiff was injured when a lawn chair on 
display in the Albertson’s store collapsed.126 After the accident, “the 
chair at issue was retained by Albertson’s for a number of 
months.”127 The discovery phase of the subsequent lawsuit 
established that “the chair was mistakenly thrown away by an 
Albertson’s employee who was cleaning out the closet that stored 
the item.”128 Subsequently, “an effort was made to find a chair 
similar to the previous one.”129 At this point, the plaintiffs amended 
their petition to include spoliation.130 The court found that this 
explanation was enough to defeat the intentional spoliation claim.131 
In addition to the preceding cases, a common theme among 
other cases where courts accept an explanation as adequate is the 
fact that the defendant had reason to believe that the matter at hand 
was previously resolved.132 This was the case in both McCleary v. 
Terrebone Parish Consolidated Government and Babineaux v. 
Black.133 
                                                                                                             
 123. Id. at 498. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771, 774 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006). 
 126. Id. at 772. 
 127. Id. at 774. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 773. 
 131. Id. at 774. 
 132. McCleary v. Terrebone Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010 
WL 3822225, at *6 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010). The plaintiffs in McCleary 
alleged spoliation over the defendants’ failure to preserve a file the plaintiffs 
wished to review. Id. The defendants noted that as far as they were aware, the 
“matter had been finally and definitively adjudicated with the supreme court’s writ 
denial in 1998.” Id. The court explicitly deemed this as an adequate explanation 
for the defendants’ failure to produce the documents. Id. See also Babineaux v. 
Black, 396 So. 2d 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1981) (finding no spoliation and 
stating that “[w]hen the engine was discarded . . . the defendants obviously 
thought that installing the new engine would solve the problem to plaintiff’s 
satisfaction”). 
 133. McCleary, 2010 WL 3822225, at *6; Babineaux, 396 So. 2d at 586. 
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If the court finds the defendant’s explanation adequate, it will 
deny the spoliation claim.134 Unfortunately, there is no set standard 
by which courts evaluate these explanations. The idea of an 
“adequate explanation” is murky, but the haze surrounding the 
element of intent, analyzed next, is even worse. 
C. Intentional or Negligent Conduct 
The most debated aspect of spoliation in Louisiana is the 
requisite level of intent.135 All of the state appellate courts have 
recognized intentional spoliation as actionable, but the courts largely 
disagree on whether to recognize a claim for negligent spoliation.136 
Normally, this type of disagreement in a state is deemed a “circuit 
split.” However, this term does not accurately reflect the state’s 
spoliation problem. This is circuit chaos. The three prominent 
viewpoints of spoliation found in the courts’ analyses do not 
conform to the circuit boundaries.137 It is true that some circuits are 
largely internally consistent in their approach, such as the Louisiana 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.138 On the other hand, the cases 
from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pay no more 
attention to the circuit’s own prior cases than they do to cases of any 
other Louisiana appellate court.139 
Not only do the courts disagree on whether to recognize 
negligent spoliation, but those that do recognize negligent spoliation 
also disagree as to the source of the duty to preserve evidence.140 
Through this disagreement, three prominent lines of reasoning have 
surfaced in the Louisiana appellate courts: 1) those courts that only 
recognize intentional spoliation; 2) the Carter camp, which cites the 
duty as originating under a statutory or contractual obligation;141 and 
                                                                                                             
 134. See, e.g., Babineaux, 396 So. 2d at 586 (citing Monk v. Monk, 144 So. 2d 
384 (La. 1962)); Veillon v. Sylvester, 174 So. 2d 189 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1965). 
 135. See Bertrand v. Fischer, No. 09–0076, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2 (W.D. 
La. Dec. 14, 2011) (“The Louisiana Circuit courts are split as to whether or not the 
act of spoliation must be intentional.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See infra Part II.C.1–3. 
 138. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 139. Compare Little v. Boston Scientific Corp., 8 So. 3d 591 (La. Ct. App. 5th 
2009) (reverting back to recognizing only intentional spoliation despite previous 
cases from the Fifth Circuit that recognized negligent spoliation), with Robertson 
v. Frank’s Super Value Foods, Inc., 7 So. 3d 669, 673–74 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009) 
(recognizing negligent spoliation on the same day Little was decided). 
 140. See infra Part II.C.1–3. 
 141. See McCleary v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208, 
2010 WL 3822225, at *3 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010); Harris v. St. Tammany 
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3) the Bethea camp, which cites the duty as originating under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.142 
1. Intentional Only—Refusal to Recognize Negligent Spoliation 
The strongest proponent of recognizing only intentional forms of 
spoliation is the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
Fourth Circuit has had a very steady line approach of endorsing only 
intentional acts of spoliation as punishable.143 In 1992, the Williams 
v. General Motors Corp. court discussed the duty that a party owes 
to the claimant in a spoliation case but did not expressly state that 
negligent claims are allowed.144 Then, the influential case of 
Kammerer v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans required 
intentional destruction of evidence for a successful spoliation 
claim.145 Subsequently, Quinn v. RISO Investment, Inc. explicitly 
endorsed only intentional claims.146 This line of holdings, which 
requires intentional conduct for a spoliation claim, has been 
consistently followed within the Fourth Circuit.147 Although this 
circuit has a clear standard, the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits do 
not. 
In Randolph v. General Motor Corp., following the Fourth 
Circuit’s lead, the First Circuit adopted an intent requirement for 
spoliation.148 The Fifth Circuit followed suit in Pham, where the 
                                                                                                             
 
Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2011 CA 0941, 2011 CA 0942, 2011 WL 
6916523, at *13 (La. Ct. App. 1st Dec. 29, 2011). 
 142. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 2315 (2013); Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Servs., 
Inc., 704 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1997) (“Although there is no statutory duty 
imposed on the defendants in this case to preserve the evidence and avoid 
hindering plaintiffs’ claim, we find a duty exists under La.Civ.Code art. 2315.”); 
Robertson, 7 So. 3d at 673. 
 143. Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357 
(La. Ct. App. 4th 1994); Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc. 869 So. 2d 922, 927 (La. Ct. 
App. 4th 2004); Everhardt v. LA Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 978 So. 2d 1036, 1045 
(La. Ct. App. 4th 2008); Williams v. Bickham, No. 2008-CA-0820, 2009 WL 
282731, at *1 (La. Ct. App. 4th Jan. 28, 2009). 
 144. 607 So. 2d 695, 697 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1992) (citing Fischer v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 429 So. 2d 538 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1983); Duhe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
635 F. Supp. 1414 (E.D. La. 1986)). 
 145. Kammerer, 633 So. 2d 1357. 
 146. Quinn, 869 So. 2d at 927 (“Allegations of negligent conduct are 
insufficient.”). 
 147. See id.; Everhardt, 978 So. 2d at 1045; Williams, 2009 WL 282731, at *1. 
 148. Randolph v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1027 (La. Ct. App 
1st 1994) (“We find that the trial court imposition of liability upon the Parish 
under the theory of spoliation of evidence was clearly wrong since the record does 
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court held that the plaintiff did not meet the requirements to 
establish a cause of action because he had not pled an intentional 
tort.149 In Little v. Boston Scientific Corp., the Fifth Circuit 
supported only intentional spoliation.150 The Fifth Circuit decided 
Little on the same day as Robertson, another case within the same 
circuit, which supported negligent spoliation.151 This exemplifies the 
indecisiveness toward the recognition of negligent spoliation. Later 
cases from both the Fifth and First Circuits support the intentional-
spoliation-only doctrine.152 With the exception of the Second 
Circuit, cases that support only intentional spoliation can be found in 
the remaining four circuits.153 
Overall, there is a large amount of jurisprudence to support this 
first line of holdings that dictates that the courts should not 
recognize negligent spoliation.154 This approach is a continuation of 
the traditional common law notion of spoliation. It continues to 
equate the destruction of evidence with the purpose of 
disadvantaging the other party in the trial. The doctrine of 
spoliation, however, has now grown to recognize the economic 
harm caused by the lack of evidence.155 The intentional-only 
approach stubbornly ignores this evolution. 
                                                                                                             
 
not indicate there was an intentional destruction of evidence by the Parish for the 
purpose of depriving the opposing parties of its use.”). 
 149. Pham v. Contico Int’l, Inc., 759 So. 2d 880, 884 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000). 
 150. Little v. Boston Scientific Corp., 8 So. 3d 591, 601 (La. Ct. App 5th 
2009). 
 151. Robertson v. Frank’s Super Value Foods, Inc., 7 So. 3d 669 (La. Ct. App. 
5th 2009). 
 152. Barthel v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 917 So. 2d 15, 20 (La. Ct. App. 
1st 2005); Jackson v. Home Depot, Inc., 906 So. 2d 721, 728 (La. Ct. App. 1st 
2005); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Queen’s Mach. Co., Ltd., 8 So. 3d 91, 97–98 (La. 
Ct. App. 5th 2009) (dismissing claim of spoliation because the court found that 
Queen’s “failed to allege that either Zurich or Alpine intentionally destroyed the 
evidence”); Kemp v. CTL Distrib., Inc., No. 10-31132, 440 F. App’x 240, 247 
(5th Cir. 2011) (“We further explicitly rejected the argument that spoliation of 
evidence ‘may also be based on the negligent destruction of evidence.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 153. Barthel, 917 So. 2d at 20; Arnold v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 10 So. 3d 
1279, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2009); Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New 
Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357, 1358 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1994); Little, 8 So. 3d at 601. 
 154. See supra notes 148, 151–52 and cases cited therein. 
 155. See Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698, 704 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995); 
Pham v. Continco Int’l., Inc., 759 So. 2d 880, 883 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000) (stating 
that Workers’ Compensation does not “shield the employer from a claim for 
economic injury that the employee may suffer as a result of the employer’s post-
accident conduct that may impair the employee’s ability to recover tort damages 
for his injuries from third parties”). 
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2. The Carter Camp—An Express Duty 
Carter v. Exide Corp. established a second line of holdings on 
how Louisiana should approach negligent spoliation, in addition to 
the intentional-only line.156 Unique at the time, Carter mandated 
that the defending party must have a specific duty to preserve the 
evidence.157 In recognizing negligent spoliation, the court realized 
that other jurisdictions consistently held that the plaintiff had to 
show that the defendant breached “something more than the general 
tort duty to act reasonably under the circumstances.”158 In this case, 
the court found that the defendant could have a duty to preserve the 
evidence because he had explicitly promised the plaintiff he would 
do so.159 Synthesizing past decisions on similar causes of action, the 
court pronounced the duty to preserve evidence for negligent 
spoliation as arising from “a statute, a contract, a special relationship 
between the parties, or an affirmative agreement or undertaking to 
preserve the evidence.”160 Carter laid the groundwork for other 
cases to accept negligent spoliation, at least in cases involving a 
statutory or contractual duty or special relationship.161 
In the First Circuit, the court in McCleary v. Terrebone Parish 
Consolidated Government characterized the duty needed for 
negligent torts as one that arises out of the “foreseeability of the 
need for the evidence in the future.”162 This interpretation combined 
the “duty” element with the “knowledge of future lawsuit” element. 
Nonetheless, McCleary characterized the pertinent question as one 
of whether the defendant had a duty “‘arising from a statute, a 
contract, a special relationship between the parties, or an affirmative 
agreement or undertaking to preserve the evidence.’”163 Harris v. St. 
Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 1 expanded this line 
                                                                                                             
 156. Carter, 661 So. 2d 698. 
 157. Id. at 705. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 700. The court ultimately allowed Carter 15 days to “amend his 
petition to allege with more particularity his claim against Firestone for failing to 
preserve the battery remains in accord with our discussion of this issue.” Id. at 
705. 
 160. Id. at 704. Further, as an economic injury, this cause of action would 
pierce the shield of Workers’ Compensation exclusivity. Id. 
 161. See infra notes 169, 181. 
 162. McCleary v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010 
WL 3822225, at *3 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010). 
 163. Id. (quoting Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 970 So. 
2d 1100, 1104–05 (La. Ct. App. 5th. 2007)). Because the court found that this was 
not met, the plaintiff had no remedy. Id. 
2014] COMMENT 527 
 
 
 
of reasoning and analysis.164 In Harris, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals allowed for recovery of a negligent act if an express duty 
existed.165 The court discussed the duty needed as one “under a 
theory of general negligence” but further defined the duty needed as 
statutory or contractual.166 Here, despite efforts to equate the duty of 
negligent spoliation with Louisiana’s general tort duty, the court 
simply followed the “statutory duty” rule promulgated by Carter.167  
In Carter, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals was 
one of the first Louisiana jurisdictions to recognize a claim for 
negligent spoliation.168 Almost all of the Second Circuit’s cases 
discussing spoliation have upheld negligent spoliation.169 Cases 
from other circuits are slowly following suit, though the other 
circuits as a whole do not consistently support this approach. 
In the Third Circuit, the McCool v. Beauregard Memorial 
Hospital and Daotheuang v. El Paso Production Oil & Gas Co. 
courts recognized a statutory or contractual duty, straying from a 
Third Circuit case that placed the source of the duty in Louisiana 
Civil Code article 2315.170 In McCool, the Third Circuit explicitly 
recognized a negligent cause of action for spoliation, necessitating a 
statutory duty.171 The Daotheuang court followed suit.172 
Unlike the Third Circuit, which has some consistency, the Fifth 
Circuit’s holdings are erratic. It was not until 2007 that a court in the 
                                                                                                             
 164. Harris v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2011 CA 
0941, 2011 CA 0942, 2011 WL 6916523, at *15 (La. Ct. App. 1st Dec. 29, 2011). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at *13–15. “[I]n Louisiana, courts have adopted a duty-risk analysis in 
determining whether to impose liability under the general negligence principles of 
LSA−C.C. art. 2315.” Id. at *14. The court later held that the plaintiff “failed to 
show that STPH had a duty to preserve the evidence for plaintiff that arose from 
either a statute, a contract, a special relationship between the parties, or an 
affirmative agreement or undertaking to preserve the evidence.” Id. at *15. After 
explicitly finding that spoliation did not apply here, the court noted that: 
Nonetheless, under general negligence principles, we find that STPH had 
a duty of care to plaintiff in the handling of the body. . . . STPH owed a 
duty to plaintiff to see that the body was sent for autopsy as ordered and 
pursuant to its own policies. Clearly, STPH blatantly breached that duty.  
Id. The Harris court failed to connect the dots linking this general duty owed and 
breached to the theory of spoliation. 
 168. Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995). 
 169. Id.; Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771, 775 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
2006); Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007); 
Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. v. Nunley, 77 So. 3d 457, 465 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2011). 
 170. McCool v. Beauregard Mem’l Hosp., 814 So. 2d 116, 119 (La. Ct. App. 
3d 2002); Daotheuang v. El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co., 940 So. 2d 752, 757 (La. 
Ct. App. 3d 2006). 
 171. McCool, 814 So. 2d at 118–19. 
 172. Daotheuang, 940 So. 2d at 756–57. 
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Fifth Circuit was faced with a spoliation of evidence claim in which 
the defendant had a statutory duty to preserve the evidence in 
question.173 Until that point, no case within the circuit had allowed 
negligent spoliation. The Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hospital 
Service District No. 1 decision marked the beginning of an 
acceptance of negligent spoliation within the Fifth Circuit.174 In 
Longwell, the plaintiffs alleged that West Jefferson Medical Center 
(WJMC) was negligent for not saving images taken during an 
operation on Karen Longwell.175 Louisiana law required that 
electronic images taken by the hospital be retained for three years 
after discharge of a patient.176 Here, despite WJMC admitting 
negligence in their failure to save the pictures, the trial court granted 
WJMC’s summary judgment on the spoliation issue because 
Longwell had not alleged or shown the act was intentional.177 When 
the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated the case, it 
found that the plaintiff’s spoliation claim failed under previous 
holdings, which required intent.178 However, the court recognized 
that the breach of a statutory duty is actionable under a theory of 
negligence.179 Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment to 
the extent that it was contrary to these findings.180 This case joined 
the Carter line of holdings. 
The Carter line of reasoning is most strongly associated with the 
Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals, but it is not exclusive to 
this circuit.181 This approach created a middle ground between the 
idea of only recognizing intentional spoliation and recognizing any 
negligent acts that may have led to spoliation. As such, many courts 
favor this approach because it offers a remedy without imposing a 
large burden on society to constantly consider what may be needed 
as evidence in the future. 
                                                                                                             
 173. Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 970 So. 2d 1100 
(La. Ct. App. 5th 2007). 
 174. Id. at 1106 (“We find the present case distinguishable from Desselle in 
that WJMC had a statutory duty to preserve the plaintiff’s records which, when 
breached, became actionable under a theory of negligence.”). 
 175. Id. at 1103. 
 176. Id. at 1102; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2144 (2008). 
 177. Longwell, 970 So. 2d at 1104. 
 178. Id. at 1106. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007); Hebert 
v. Richard, 72 So. 3d 892 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011); Pham v. Contico Int’l, Inc., 759 
So. 2d 880, 883 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000). 
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3. The Bethea Camp—A General Tort Duty 
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals is the birthplace 
of the third line of holdings.182 The Bethea v. Modern Biomedical 
Services court championed this approach, redefining the concept of 
a defendant’s duty in a spoliation claim and ignoring Carter.183 The 
Bethea court turned to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and held 
that the duty to preserve evidence was found in general tort 
liability, not a specific statute or agreement.184 The court reasoned 
as follows: 
Intentionally hindering a plaintiff’s civil claim when there 
is no statutory duty to prevent this action is just as violative 
of our civilian notion of justice and fair play as when a 
statutory duty is imposed. For purposes of this issue, this 
court fails to see the benefit of making a distinction 
between a specific statutory duty and the far-reaching duty 
La.Civ.Code art. 2315 imposes.185 
The holding eliminated the need for a specific duty to be 
identified.186 This lessened the plaintiff’s burden of proving 
negligent spoliation. Yet, many circuits and cases chose to avoid 
this avenue.187 
The Third Circuit does not consistently follow Bethea. Later 
cases from the circuit have, at times, endorsed all three lines of 
holdings. 188 The next case to discuss spoliation in the Third Circuit, 
                                                                                                             
 182. Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Servs. Inc., 704 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. App. 
3d 1997). 
 183. See id. at 1233. 
 184. Id. (“Although there is no statutory duty imposed on the defendants in this 
case to preserve the evidence and avoid hindering plaintiffs’ claim, we find a duty 
exists under La.Civ.Code art. 2315. The absence of a statutory duty is not 
tantamount to no duty. The parameters of what constitutes fault in Louisiana reach 
far and wide in order to hold people accountable for their harmful actions 
regardless of whether or not their actions are covered by a statutory provision.”). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See, e.g., Barthel v. State Dep’t. of Transp. & Dev., 917 So. 2d 15, 21 (La. 
Ct. App. 1st 2005); Smith v. Jitney Jungle of Am., 802 So. 2d 988, 994 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 2001); Guillory v. Dillard’s Dep’t. Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d 1, 4 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d 2000); Quinn v. RISO Invs, Inc., 869 So. 2d 922, 926–27 (La. Ct. App. 
4th 2004); Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 534 (La. 
Ct. App. 5th 2004). 
 188. See Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Servs., 704 So. 2d 1227, 1233 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d 1997); McCool v. Beauregard Mem’l Hosp., 814 So. 2d 116, 119 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d 2002); Daotheuang v. El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co., 940 So. 2d 752, 757 
(La. Ct. App. 3d 2006); Hebert v. Richard, 72 So. 3d 892, 905 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2011). 
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Guillory v. Dillard’s Department Store, Inc., took no notice of 
Bethea.189 Despite laying the foundation for a general tort duty in 
the analysis, the court did not accept the plaintiff’s argument that 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 set forth the duty to preserve the 
evidence.190 However, the court may have dismissed the spoliation 
claim because the court found that the defendant was unaware of the 
alleged tort and the probability of a future lawsuit.191 Regardless, 
this case only added to the confusion. The subsequent spoliation 
cases in the Third Circuit reverted back to the Carter notion of a 
more specific duty.192 
However, Bethea was not forgotten. The Fifth Circuit in 
Robertson v. Frank’s Super Value Foods returned to the Bethea 
notion of a general tort duty.193 By citing Bethea, the court held that 
claims of negligent spoliation were allowed without a statutory or 
express duty.194 “It has been held that a duty to preserve evidence 
can exist without the imposition of a statutory duty.”195 This holding 
rooted the duty for negligent spoliation in article 2315.196 
                                                                                                             
 189. Guillory, 777 So. 2d at 4. It merely noted that when damage results from a 
party destroying evidence, the exact name of the claim was of little importance. Id. 
“[W]e believe that it is of little importance here, to determine an exact title to label 
plaintiff’s claim for damages resulting from the acts alleged; for when a plaintiff 
alleges sufficient facts which indicate that he or she has suffered damages caused 
by another’s fault, that plaintiff has asserted a claim actionable under Louisiana 
tort law.” Id. 
 190. Id. (“The plaintiff alleges that pursuant to La.Civ.Code. art. 2315, a duty 
was imposed on Dillard’s to preserve the keys on which Ms. Guillory allegedly 
slipped and fell. . . . Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to show that Dillard’s had a 
duty to preserve the set of keys, simply because Ms. Guillory claimed she slipped 
and fell on them while in the department store.”). 
 191. Id. at 6 (“We find nothing to suggest that at the time Dillard’s received the 
keys and was notified of Ms. Guillory’s accident under either account, it was 
under a legal duty to preserve the keys which belonged to an unknown person.”). 
 192. See, e.g., McCool, 814 So. 2d at 119; Daotheuang, 940 So. 2d at 757; 
Hebert, 72 So. 3d at 905. 
 193. Robertson v. Frank’s Super Value Foods, Inc., 7 So. 3d 669, 673–74 (La. 
Ct. App. 5th 2009). 
 194. Id. (“In considering the defendant’s exception of no cause of action on the 
latter claims, the court examined the issue under La. C.C. art. 2315 and it dictates 
that ‘[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by 
whose fault it happened to repair it.’ In finding that the plaintiff did state a cause 
of action for negligent and/or intentional spoliation of evidence in the absence of a 
statutory duty, the court recognized that each individual is accountable for his or 
her actions as they affect fellow members of society.”). 
 195. Id. Though the court said “statutory duty,” it seemed as though it meant a 
duty other than those designated by Carter (“a statute, a contract, a special 
relationship between the parties, or an affirmative agreement or undertaking to 
preserve the evidence”) could be upheld. See Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 
698, 704 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995). 
 196. Robertson, 7 So. 3d at 673–74. 
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In sum, there is a large and apparent disagreement within the 
Louisiana circuit courts on the issue of spoliation of evidence. The 
lines that distinguish the varying viewpoints do not neatly coincide 
with the circuits themselves as a “circuit split” would. There is no 
consistent theme of what elements must be met for a successful 
claim or what levels of culpability and fault are needed.197 While the 
courts agree on some aspects, such as knowledge of the impending 
lawsuit, they are divided on whether to recognize negligent 
spoliation and, if so, where the duty for this delict originates.198 This 
muddled doctrine has led to bad case precedent and results.199 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court or Louisiana Legislature should answer 
the circuit chaos. The following Part suggests certain elements for 
the tort of spoliation that are in line with civilian tradition, uphold 
the integrity of the court system and Louisiana’s contract and 
statutory law, and are consistent with the concepts of equity and 
truth. 
III. THE GOOD WITCH DELIVERS AN IDEAL SET OF ELEMENTS FOR 
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE 
The Louisiana Supreme Court or the Louisiana Legislature 
should establish the elements of spoliation and the burden of proof 
needed to succeed on the merits of a claim. At minimum, the Carter 
theory of negligent spoliation should be adopted in order to protect 
the integrity of Louisiana’s contract and statutory law.200 Further, 
equity, judicial integrity, and the concepts of truth and fairness 
support the adoption of the Bethea theory, at least in limited 
circumstances. In recognizing a cause of action for negligent 
spoliation, Louisiana would be a progressive leader among its sister 
states.201 
A. Party Knew or Reasonably Should Have Known of the Future 
Lawsuit 
The first element of spoliation should consider whether the 
defending party knew or reasonably should have known that a 
lawsuit would likely ensue. The idea that a court must evaluate 
                                                                                                             
 197. Bertrand v. Fischer, No. 09–0076, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2 (W.D. La. 
Dec. 14, 2011) (“The Louisiana Circuit courts are split as to whether or not the act 
of spoliation must be intentional.”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493, 496–98 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
2007). 
 200. See infra Part III.C. 
 201. See supra Part I.B. 
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whether a party “should have known” about a future lawsuit 
automatically carries with it an objective reasonableness standard.202 
It should not suffice for an accused party to merely state that he or 
she was unaware of a pending or likely suit and thus avoid 
accountability for destruction of evidence. Because of the incentive 
to be dishonest, courts should expressly walk through an objective 
analysis—considering facts and circumstances, rather than weighing 
only testimony—when determining whether the party had 
knowledge. Following the standard set by Texas jurisprudence, the 
courts should analyze “whether a reasonable person would conclude 
from the severity of the accident and other circumstances 
surrounding it that there was a substantial chance for litigation.”203 
Utilization of this standard will ensure these cases uphold the 
principles of truth and fairness upon which the judicial system is 
based. 
This objective reasonableness approach was implicitly utilized by 
a Louisiana court in Randolph.204 In Randolph, the trial court 
discussed whether the Terrebone Parish Consolidated Government 
(TPCG) should have anticipated a future lawsuit.205 Finding that the 
TPCG knew the plaintiff had injured himself and that the cause of the 
injury was a malfunctioning piece of TPCG’s equipment, TPCG “had 
enough information for it to know or presume that some type of claim 
for either workman’s compensation, medical reimbursement, and/or 
personal injuries may [have been] made by Mr. Randolph.”206 The 
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with 
this conclusion and overruled the trial court.207 Despite the awareness 
of the plaintiff’s injuries, the First Circuit reasoned that any 
expectation of a future suit was diminished by the fact that the 
plaintiff returned to “work within a few days and worked without 
interruption for over seven months.”208 Further bolstering the court of 
appeals’s decision to disallow the plaintiff’s spoliation claim was the 
fact that the plaintiff did not file suit until almost one year after the 
accident and did not request to inspect the faulty equipment until 
                                                                                                             
 202. WILLIAM SHELBY MCKENZIE & H. ALSTON JOHNSON III, INSURANCE 
LAW & PRACTICE § 5:5, in 15 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 448 (4th ed. 2012) 
(“[T]he traditional tort inquiry that asks what consequences an objective 
reasonable person might expect from a deliberate act.”). 
 203. Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, No. 12-08-00368-CV, 2010 WL 
2982902, at *6 (Tex. App. July 30, 2010). 
 204. Randolph v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1027−28 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 1994). 
 205. Id. at 1027. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1028. 
 208. Id. 
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even later than that.209 Despite the differing conclusions of the trial 
and appellate courts, both objectively evaluated the circumstances in 
order to establish whether it was likely that TPCG should have 
known litigation was probable. This is an example of a court openly 
evaluating the facts and circumstances to determine whether the 
party had knowledge of the impending suit. This type of discussion 
thwarts efforts of the defendants to avoid liability by falsely stating 
that they were not aware of the likelihood of litigation. An objective 
evaluation would uphold the integrity of our judicial system and 
refrain from implicitly condoning a defendant’s dishonesty. 
B. Party Fails to Produce Evidence 
The second element of spoliation should be the failure of the 
defending party to produce the needed evidence. The three sub-
requirements to this element are that: (1) the evidence existed at one 
time, (2) the absence of the evidence impairs the plaintiff’s case, and 
(3) the defendant lacks an adequate explanation for the absence. 
These requirements are associated with the purpose of spoliation 
claims: to compensate the plaintiff for the economic injury to his or 
her suit due to the lack of requested evidence. This is the heart of the 
cause of action. 
1. Evidence Must Have Previously Existed 
It is perfectly logical that one cannot destroy or hide evidence 
that never existed; however, below the surface of this element lies 
injustice. Facially, the Jackson210 decision was sound in holding that 
a party could not be charged with spoliating an accident report 
merely because the party failed to create it. But when applying this 
requirement to other situations, the outcome is inequitable. 
In certain situations, the failure to create evidence should be 
actionable because society would expect those materials, such as an 
autopsy report, to be produced. Hence, an exception should be 
recognized. If a plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that 
documentation was being created in the normal course of business 
and the lack of documentation drastically hinders the plaintiff’s 
case, spoliation should be allowed in cases where the evidence never 
existed. 
                                                                                                             
 209. Id. 
 210. Jackson v. Home Depot, Inc., 906 So. 2d 721 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2005). 
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The need for an exception to this rule is exemplified in Harris v. 
St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 1.211 In Harris, 
Mrs. Harris suddenly died while she was being transported from an 
operating room to a care unit.212 Subsequently, Dr. Breaux ordered 
an autopsy in order to determine the cause of death.213 The plaintiff, 
Mr. Harris, also requested an autopsy of his wife.214 The hospital 
sent the body straight to a funeral home rather than to a coroner, and 
the autopsy never took place.215 Under the false impression that an 
autopsy had taken place, Mrs. Harris was embalmed, making an 
autopsy impossible.216 After the death, “an Adverse Drug Reaction 
Form was anonymously completed by [St. Tammany Parish 
Hospital] indicating that [a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist] 
had administered 50 milligrams of Brevibloc to Mrs. Harris and that 
the drug reaction was ‘severe.’”217 Mr. Harris filed suit against the 
hospital for negligence, including “contributing to the spoliation 
and/or destruction of evidence, including toxicology screen, blood 
work and other post-mortem diagnostic testing, which would have 
been undertaken and would have disclosed the cause of death had 
[the hospital] not released the body to Fielding [Funeral Home].”218 
Under these facts, refusing recovery to Mr. Harris in his 
spoliation claim because an autopsy report was never created is 
contrary to the theory of spoliation. Spoliation is centered on the 
economic hindrance to a party’s claim by the actions of the 
defendant.219 The law does not want to give defending parties an 
incentive to hide evidence in order to be successful on a claim.220 
Nevertheless, the law should not disincentivize the creation of 
evidence, especially if it is procedural documentation in the normal 
course of business. Although it seems likely that Mrs. Harris had an 
adverse reaction to the drug administered to her, without an autopsy 
report this would be very difficult to prove. The lack of an autopsy 
report was a severe impairment to Mr. Harris’s case, and accordingly, 
                                                                                                             
 211. Harris v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2011 CA 
0941, 2011 CA 0942, 2011 WL 6916523 (La. Ct. App. 1st Dec. 29, 2011). 
 212. Id. at *1. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at *2. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(“We appreciate that one who has suffered a legally recognized injury is usually 
entitled to an award of damages.”). 
 220. Id. at 834–35 (“False testimony and subornation of perjury occur during 
the trial and do adversely affect the public at large by interfering with the judicial 
process as well as impacting on an individual plaintiff.”). 
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he should have been allowed to apply the theory of spoliation of 
evidence. The court admitted that the hospital was negligent in the 
handling of the body and had a duty to Mr. Harris to handle the 
body with care, yet it failed to find a claim for spoliation.221 
Therefore, the courts should allow spoliation of evidence claims 
in select cases where it is apparent that the defendant’s failure to 
create evidence, which the plaintiff could have reasonably expected 
to have been created, impaired the claim. This exception should 
center around the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation that certain 
evidence exists.222 If the defendant would reasonably be expected to 
document transactions, whether by writing receipts, using security 
cameras, or taking notes, the plaintiff should not be deprived of 
these items because the defendant intentionally or negligently failed 
to document an occurrence. It is reasonable for a party to expect that 
banks have security cameras recording what happens on their 
premises or that a lawyer would document monetary damages while 
holding them for his client. These are routine and expected 
examples of documentation. 
Allowing claims of spoliation in cases where intent or 
negligence causes a failure to create documentation might deter 
entities from routinely documenting events. This argument is similar 
to the reasoning behind the “work product” doctrine, a principle 
found in evidence law.223 In creating the work product doctrine to 
protect a lawyer’s notes from being subjected to scrutiny, the U.S. 
Supreme Court sought to avoid deterring lawyers from writing out 
their thoughts and strategies for a particular case.224 Although well-
founded, this principle does not present a real-world threat to the 
                                                                                                             
 221. Harris, 2011 WL 6916523, at *15. 
 222. See Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. v. Nunley, 77 So. 3d 457, 464 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 2011). Acadian attempted to obtain a servitude over the Nunleys’ 
property through a judicial decree in order to install a natural gas pipeline. Id. at 
459–60. In an attempt to refrain from having the servitude granted, the Nunleys 
argued that the route chosen was done so “arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith.” 
Id. at 461. The Nunleys claimed spoliation for the defendant’s failure to produce 
hard data supporting its route selection process. Id. Such data had not been 
produced in the first place. Id. This was accepted as an adequate explanation 
despite the fact that the plaintiff’s expert testified that “in a project of this size, 
failure to document the route selection process would be engineering malpractice.” 
Id. at 465. 
 223. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). 
 224. Id. at 510−11 (“Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is 
bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the 
rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is 
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from 
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. . . . Were such 
materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put 
down in writing would remain unwritten.”). 
536 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
routine creation of documents in the ordinary course of business. It 
would be impractical for a coroner to never write an autopsy report 
but merely relay the findings orally. It would not be feasible for 
insurance companies to only enter into oral contracts with their 
insureds. Accordingly, it is fair to conclude that an entity has a duty 
to tender documentation where the plaintiff would reasonably expect 
it to be routinely produced. Therefore, in limited circumstances, 
Louisiana should allow spoliation claims in cases where the relevant 
evidence never existed. 
2. The Failure to Produce Evidence Must Impair the Claimant’s 
Case 
A spoliation claim should only be successful if the missing 
evidence in some way impairs the plaintiff’s case. Nevertheless, 
because tort liability allows for varying ranges of damages and fault, 
it should not be necessary that the missing evidence is the threshold 
for the case in order to be actionable. If the missing evidence does 
not bar the party from recovery but merely reduces the judgment 
amount, the plaintiff should be allowed to recoup the amount by 
which the spoliation diminished the recovery. Thus, if a party is 
rendered a judgment of $50,000 but would have been granted 
$150,000 if a key piece of evidence had been present, the plaintiff 
suffered a loss despite the award of damages. Because economic 
injury is the basis for spoliation, claims should be allowed where it 
can be shown that the missing evidence decreased a judgment 
recovered by the plaintiff. 
3. An “Adequate” Explanation for the Failure to Produce 
Evidence Will Defeat a Spoliation Claim 
While an adverse presumption can be rebutted by explaining the 
circumstance surrounding the act,225 tort liability should not be 
absolved by a mere explanation of what led to the present damages. 
Louisiana jurisprudence has failed to clearly distinguish between a 
cause of action for the tort of spoliation and a request for an adverse 
presumption based on spoliation.226 Because the two remedies are 
                                                                                                             
 225. See Roby & Carter, supra note 61, at 224. 
 226. See, e.g., Randolph v. Gen. Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1026 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 1994). Though the Randolph court only talked about the adverse 
presumption, after finding the third party liable for spoliation, the trial court 
imposed 50% liability on the party. Id. at 1023. This is not a presumption. In 
McCleary, despite the fact that the plaintiffs sought damages for spoliation as a 
separate tort action, the court discussed the adverse presumption and what is 
needed. McCleary v. Terrebone Parish Consol. Gov’t., No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010 
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entangled in courts’ analyses, the courts consider defendants’ 
explanations when faced with the tort of spoliation. While applying 
this “affirmative defense” to the tort of spoliation is incorrect, it is 
important for a practicing lawyer to be aware of the courts’ actions. 
Any story as to why evidence cannot be produced should not be 
adequate to overcome an adverse presumption or monetary damages 
for impairment of a claim. This incentivizes defendants to lie and 
undermines the integrity of spoliation claims. The Wilhite case, 
which held the doctor’s explanation of the missing medical chart 
adequate, is a bad model for the growth of Louisiana’s doctrine.227 
The court allowed a doctor to merely state that a nurse had lost the 
file.228 Not only did the doctor have a statutory duty to maintain 
medical records, but his explanation lacked any corroboration.229 
Regardless of the truth of the doctor’s explanation, setting the bar so 
low as to what will alleviate a party from liability will incentivize 
future parties to recite a similar story that includes negligence, then 
an unsuccessful effort to find the lost evidence. Thus, every claim 
would be defeated immediately with such a story, and this would 
undermine the theory of spoliation. The courts should place a high 
burden on what is considered an “adequate” explanation because 
this defense obliterates the plaintiff’s recovery. 
A high burden does not necessarily mean an impossible burden. 
In fact, many explanations may reasonably justify the absence of 
evidence, such as the fact that the evidence was destroyed during 
part of routine business practice. Such was the explanation in 
Kammerer.230 The evidence in question, a manhole cover, was the 
property of and maintained by the Sewage and Water Board of New 
Orleans.231 After replacing the cover, the “cover in question was 
immediately destroyed by employees of the defendant.”232 This was 
normal procedure that was “implemented as a safety precaution.”233 
                                                                                                             
 
WL 3822225, at *1–2 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010). The court then found 
spoliation was not present because the explanation of the party was “adequate.” Id. 
at *6. This confuses the tort and adverse presumption. In Harris, the plaintiffs 
sought damages for spoliation under the tort. Harris v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp. 
Serv. Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2011 CA 0941, 2011 CA 0942, 2011 WL 6916523 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 2011). Yet, the court discussed the adverse presumption and said an 
adequate explanation eliminates liability. Id. at 18. 
 227. Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493, 499 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 40:1299.96(A)(3) (2008). 
 230. Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357 
(La. Ct. App. 4th 1994). 
 231. Id. at 1357. 
 232. Id. at 1358.  
 233. Id. 
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The supervisor testified that “he had replaced numerous manhole 
covers and that none of the other destroyed covers had become the 
subject of litigation.”234 The court found that these statements 
formed a good basis to accept the explanation as “adequate.”235 
Judge Plotkin, dissenting, explained that “obviously, routine 
destruction of evidence could be a ‘reasonable explanation’ for a 
failure to produce evidence in certain cases. However, [he did] not 
believe that this is one of those cases.”236 Judge Plotkin warned that 
an exception based on the routine destruction of evidence “provides 
a disincentive to the defendant to preserve important evidence and 
therefore should not be sanctioned because it is against public 
policy.”237 
Destruction in the routine course of business might be an 
adequate explanation at times. However, the court should look at the 
explanation of the defending party in conjunction with the 
surrounding factors, such as familiarity with litigation. If it appears, 
as it did to Judge Plotkin in Kammerer, that the explanation is 
insufficient to justify the actions taken by the defendant and that a 
reasonably prudent person in the defendant’s shoes would have 
acted differently, then the explanation should not be allowed to 
defeat a spoliation claim. 
C. Level of Intent 
The third element for spoliation is the level of culpability 
necessary. All Louisiana circuits accept intentional spoliation.238 As 
such, the third element in an intentional spoliation action would be 
for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant intentionally destroyed, 
altered, or failed to preserve the evidence. At that point, the prima 
facie claim for intentional spoliation is complete. However, this is 
                                                                                                             
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 1367 (Plotkin, J., dissenting). 
 237. Id. at 1368. Also, his finding that the Sewage and Water Board of New 
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nothing new. The more difficult question is whether Louisiana 
should recognize negligent spoliation. Accepting negligent 
spoliation is progressive because few states have recognized the 
tort.239 However, recognition of negligent spoliation is consistent 
with Louisiana’s tort law and Civil Code article 2315. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court or the Louisiana Legislature should 
formally recognize negligent spoliation in order to protect our 
citizens and the integrity of our law. 
1. Existing Law Supports the Recognition of Negligent 
Spoliation 
The courts and Legislature need only look to the sound 
reasoning of Carter and Bethea to find support for negligent 
spoliation claims. However, if these cases themselves are not 
persuasive, one need look no further than the general principles of 
contract and statutory law, the Louisiana Constitution, and the 
Louisiana Civil Code for justification. 
a. Negligent Spoliation is Necessary to Uphold the Integrity of 
Contract and Statutory Laws 
Failing to recognize negligent spoliation, a concept consistent 
with Louisiana’s civilian tradition, threatens the integrity of the 
State’s statutes and contract law. At the very least, Louisiana should 
formally accept the Carter notion that where “a statute, a contract, a 
special relationship between the parties, or an affirmative agreement 
or undertaking to preserve the evidence” is present, then a duty 
exists on behalf of the defendant.240 These duties should be upheld 
because they are part of a larger body of law whose stability is 
undermined by the failure to accept negligent spoliation. If the 
courts do not enforce statutory provisions that require the 
maintenance of documents, as was the case in Wilhite, then the 
argument to enforce them in other instances is severely 
weakened.241 For this reason, it is necessary that Louisiana accept 
negligent spoliation where a statutory duty is found in order to 
maintain the integrity of its laws. The same idea can be applied to 
contracts. 
If the courts refuse to enforce a contractual provision requiring a 
party to preserve evidence or “an affirmative agreement or 
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undertaking to preserve the evidence,”242 which is essentially an oral 
contract, then this will open the door for the unenforceability of 
other contractual agreements without a sufficient basis in law or 
reason. In contract law, the court will not uphold clauses if they are 
illegal, unreasonable, or unjust.243 But that is not the case here. In 
some instances, the parties have mutually agreed to form obligations 
between them through a document or oral agreement. If these 
agreements do not violate existing laws or the rights of either party, 
then under sound contract law, they should be upheld. 
b. Negligent Spoliation Encompasses the Judicial Integrity and 
Fairness for Which the Louisiana Constitution Strives 
The Louisiana Constitution supports negligent spoliation. The 
Constitution states that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person 
shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, 
administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for 
injury to him in his person, property, reputation or other rights.”244 
This clause declares that Louisiana’s judicial system is in place so 
that citizens may have a fair adjudication of their claims.245 The 
Constitution supports the notion that any hindrance to a citizen 
utilizing the judicial system should be eliminated or compensable. 
Essential to the fabric of the construction is the citizen’s 
right of access to the evidence necessary to prove his case, 
without which mere access to the courts would be vain and 
useless. . . . Whether judge or jury, the trier of fact’s ability 
to accomplish its goals of fairness and truth depends on the 
quality of the evidence put before it. . . . Where material 
evidence has been lost, the veracity and justice of the 
ultimate decision will of necessity suffer. Where that 
evidence has been wrongfully and intentionally destroyed, 
the injury is not only to the prejudiced party but also to the 
justice system itself and to the public’s confidence in that 
system.246 
                                                                                                             
 242. Carter, 661 So. 2d at 704. 
 243. See Sanchez v. Commodore Cruise Lines, Ltd., 713 So. 2d 572, 576 (La. 
Ct. App. 4th 1998) (citing Lejano v. Bandak, 705 So. 2d 158 (La. 1998)) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court held that a forum selection clause should be enforced absent a 
clear showing that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the 
clause is invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching . . . .”). 
 244. LA. CONST. art. 1 § 22. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357, 
1362 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1994) (Waltzer, J., concurring). 
2014] COMMENT 541 
 
 
 
The West Virginia Supreme Court also looked to its state 
constitution and the notions of judicial fairness and access to support 
the recognition of negligent spoliation.247 In order to maintain the 
fairness and confidence in Louisiana’s judicial system that is 
discussed in the State’s Constitution, Louisiana should formally 
recognize negligent spoliation. 
c. Negligent Spoliation Is Supported by the Louisiana Civil Code 
Looking to the concepts of fairness and justice, in limited 
circumstances, Louisiana should allow the duty for negligent 
spoliation to be found in article 2315 as the Bethea court suggests. 
Foremost, Louisiana Civil Code article 1757 states that “[o]bligations 
arise from contracts and other declarations of will. They also arise 
directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of will, in instances 
such as wrongful acts, the management of the affairs of another, 
unjust enrichment and other acts or facts.”248 When a person 
negligently destroys evidence that hinders the plaintiff’s claim, then 
the source of the obligation is a juridical fact.249 As civilian law very 
commonly accepts juridical facts as a source of obligations to other 
parties, it should be no different for negligent spoliation. Liability 
under tort law is “nonconsensual” and unrelated to “voluntary 
undertakings.”250 “Smith [the first case to recognize spoliation in 
general] should not be limited to cases in which custodians of 
potentially relevant evidence agree to preserve the matter until 
trial.”251 The Civil Code is a “solemn expression of legislative 
will.”252 Thus, Louisiana endorses imposing tort liability where no 
contractual agreement is present. 
In recognizing negligent spoliation against third parties, the 
Alabama Supreme Court noted that the general principles of 
negligence law present in the state were sufficient to support such an 
action.253 In the same sense, Louisiana’s article 2315 lays the 
foundation for a negligent spoliation claim. Bethea’s motivation for 
recognizing a duty under article 2315 for negligent spoliation claims 
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is that it is a true representation of Louisiana law.254 Bethea advocates 
that the Legislature promulgated article 2315 to cover specific 
wrongs that the drafters could not have imagined at the time.255 The 
drafters “realized[] no one could foresee all possible types of civil 
injuries and accidents that might befall people.”256 Mostly, Bethea 
discussed Louisiana’s notion of fault. “The parameters of what 
constitutes fault in Louisiana reach far and wide in order to hold 
people accountable for their harmful actions regardless of whether 
or not their actions are covered by a statutory provision.”257 Having 
a broad view of fault allows the courts the discretion to recognize an 
obligation arising from a fault previously overlooked.258 
The Framers of Louisiana’s Civil Code viewed fault broadly “as 
a breach of a preexisting obligation, for which the law orders 
reparation, when it causes damage to another, and they left it to the 
court to determine in each case the existence of an anterior 
obligation which would make an act constitute fault.”259 
The idea that fault is a broad concept was not novel to Bethea. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Veazey v. Elmwood Planatation 
Associates, Ltd. noted that instead of defining “fault” for every 
applicable situation, the Civil Code gives a broad notion, and the 
application is left to the courts.260 Veazey looked to the Louisiana 
Civil Law Treatise, which states that: 
[F]ault is the mirror of our times: what we, people of 
Louisiana, decide to be fault, that is fault. As such, fault is a 
fluid term definable only with respect to its surroundings and 
thus, with the concept of fault, we can incorporate into our 
law a new situation without changing our definition of fault: 
fault remains the same; it is we, members of society who 
change.261 
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Article 2315 was purposely construed broadly so that 
Louisiana’s delictual law would not become stagnant. As society 
changes to find that certain conduct falls below a proper standard, 
that fault should become actionable through evolving law.262 “[T]he 
Louisiana application of fault in Article 2315 may be described 
simply as a legal determination of whether or not one will be made 
to repair damage caused by his actions—regardless of whether the 
tortfeasor’s damage causing conduct may be considered 
imprudent.”263 Louisiana should utilize the safeguard provided in 
article 2315 to handle evolving law and find that the act of negligent 
spoliation falls below society’s standards of proper conduct. 
Article 2315 states that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes 
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair 
it.”264 This article alone justifies allowing negligent spoliation 
claims where no statutory or contractual duty is present because 
spoliation causes the plaintiff to suffer harm. However, it is harsh to 
mandate that every member of society should, at all times, consider 
what may or may not be evidence for some future trial. Therefore, 
article 2315 should be used in limited circumstances. These 
circumstances may include negligent spoliation by entities or 
businesses that for all practical purposes should be familiar with the 
frequency of litigation or the Carter notion of “a special relationship 
between the parties.”  Another circumstance in which article 2315 
might be utilized to hold a defendant responsible for negligent 
spoliation is a situation of gross negligence in which the defendant’s 
actions were so imprudent that it is only fair to grant recovery. For 
instance, it was appropriate for Velasco, the California case that first 
recognized negligent spoliation, to find that a janitor should not be 
held liable under general negligence principles for spoliating 
evidence because the janitor threw away a paper bag that contained 
a broken bottle.265 Additionally, it was inappropriate for the court in 
Gladney v. Milam to find that no spoliation occurred where the 
defendant knew of the claims of the allegedly defective Firestone 
tire and yet sold the vehicle to a salvage yard, making the tire 
unavailable for testing.266 Because the defendant was a national 
insurance company and was aware of the allegations, it was grossly 
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negligent in selling the vehicle to a salvage yard. Ultimately, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court should articulate a standard for when article 
2315 should supplant the statutory or contractual duty requirement in 
order to allow for equitable recovery by a plaintiff. 
2. Negligent Spoliation Is Equitable 
Further, if none of the prior arguments persuade the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, the Court should accept negligent spoliation because 
it is equitable. Though the defending parties may be doing so 
negligently, their failure to use reasonable care that results in 
destroyed evidence leads to unjust enrichment at the plaintiffs’ 
expense.267 To protect plaintiffs from harm, Louisiana should 
recognize negligent spoliation in order to uphold the notions of truth 
and fairness and eliminate the incentive to lie. 
a. Promotes Truth and Fairness 
In order to support the principles of fairness in the judicial 
proceedings and the truthfulness of the result, a claim for negligent 
spoliation should be allowed. “Destruction of evidence undermines 
two important goals of the judicial system—truth and fairness . . . . 
Destruction of evidence is unfair because it potentially creates 
inequality of access to information.”268 Our judicial system operates 
under the adversarial system, which is thought to promote true results 
because of the incentive each side has “to produce evidence favorable 
to its position.”269 When evidence is spoliated, it “stands the 
assumption of the adversary system on its head: the parties, instead of 
feeding the fact finder all relevant evidence, become engines of 
destruction, purging the record of the relevant material that is 
favorable to the other side.”270 Allowing a party to be disadvantaged 
in litigation due to the actions of another, even if negligent, reduces 
the overall fairness of our judicial process. “Controlling destruction of 
evidence promotes fairness in the same way that liberal discovery 
rules do: control enhances equality of access to information, and 
hence negates an undeserved advantage by the party who began with 
the greater share of evidence under his control.”271 
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b. Eliminates Incentive to Lie 
Finally, recognizing a claim for negligent spoliation would reduce 
the incentive to lie. Judge Waltzer, concurring in Kammerer, 
discussed in detail why an adverse presumption was in line with both 
civilian tradition and Louisiana jurisprudence.272 In doing so, she 
justified the need for an adverse presumption by saying that without 
it, “there would be no loss to the destroying party, and a message 
would go out to the community that evidence germane to issues in the 
judicial process may be destroyed at will without negative 
consequence.”273 This message would negatively impact the 
effectiveness and fairness of adjudications.274 This same logic 
justifies the need for negligent spoliation. By allowing a party to 
escape the consequences of disposing of evidence merely because 
they stated that it was an accident would send the message that Judge 
Waltzer so feared. A set of facts that would be completely actionable 
under intentional spoliation could quickly become completely non-
actionable if the defending party merely states that its acts of 
spoliation were an accident. This instant loss of a claim by the parties 
is not in the best interest of our judicial system, nor our state. 
CONCLUSION 
As noted in Lewis, “this issue [of spoliation] is certainly ripe for 
consideration.”275 There is a drastic disparity in how Louisiana 
circuits treat the doctrine of negligent spoliation. The Louisiana 
Supreme Court or Louisiana Legislature must recognize negligent 
spoliation. At a minimum, negligent spoliation should be found when 
a statutory or contractual duty is present, and in limited 
circumstances, the duty should be found in article 2315. If negligent 
spoliation is not adopted, Louisiana will erode statutory and contract 
law, the judicial system will lose integrity, and the courts will 
condone lying by litigants. For the sake of Louisiana’s citizens and its 
law, it is time for Louisiana to formally recognize negligent 
spoliation. 
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